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Evidence
Geo. W. Pugh*
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Expert Witnesses
Before a physician called by the state is permitted to give
expert testimony as to the mental condition of an accused, is the
defense entitled to cross examine the witness, not only as to his
general qualifications, but also as to the extent of his examina-
tion and observation of the accused? In State v. Augustine' the
Supreme Court answered in the negative. Article 466 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure provides that before a witness can
give evidence as an expert, his "competency" to testify as an
expert must have been established to the satisfaction of the
court. The test of competency of an expert, states the article, is
"his knowledge of the subject about which he is called upon to
express an opinion." In the Augustine case the last quoted
phrase is apparently interpreted as referring to the witness'
familiarity with the general field of knowledge involved, not his
knowledge of the particular facts at issue in the particular pro-
ceedings.
IMPEACHMENT
Surprise and Hostility
May a party impeach his own witness even though not taken
by "surprise" by his testimony? Article 487 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that "no one can impeach his own
witness, unless he have been taken by surprise by the testimony
of such witness, or unless the witness show hostility toward him,
and, even then, the impeachment must be limited to evidence of
prior contradictory statements." Prior to the adoption of the
Code of Criminal Procedure,2 the court, relying on Wharton's
Criminal Evidence,3 took the position that hostility alone would
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 241 La. 761, 131 So.2d 56 (1961). ,
2. State v. Bodoin, 153 La. 641, 96 So. 501 (1923).
3. 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 484a (10th ed.
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not suffice to permit a party to impeach his own witness - that
to do this the hostility must come unexpectedly. After the adop-
tion of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the light of Article
487, the court, in State v. Williams4 took the contrary position.
In the recent case of State v. Willis5 the court followed the inter-
pretation placed upon the article in the Williams case (that
either hostility or surprise would suffice).
The position taken in the Willis case is certainly grounded
upon a reasonable interpretation of Article 487. Whether the
law should be otherwise is, of course, another question. Where
the prior contradictory statement is admissible solely for the
purpose of impeaching the testimony given by the witness on the
stand, the Willis case holds that the trial judge must instruct
the jury that it is not to treat the testimony as substantive evi-
dence of defendant's guilt. If a party knows in advance that a
person will give testimony unfavorable to his position, and he
nevertheless calls him as a witness with the intention of im-
peaching him by a prior contradictory statement, then it seems
reasonable to presume that he is doing so with the hope that the
jury will ascribe substantive weight to the prior contradictory
statement. As a practical matter, this writer shares the view of
many that, despite judicial instruction to the contrary, juries
will in fact ascribe substantive as well as neutralizing effect to
such impeaching testimony. If the policy of the law is really
against such conduct by the jury, then would it not be better to
amend Article 487 to provide that hostility alone would not be
sufficient to permit a party to impeach his own witness - that
surprise is a sine qua non?6
When a party wishes to show that a witness he has called is
hostile, in order that the witness may be impeached by a prior
contradictory statement, how can this be done? The Willis case
states: "[I]t is not necessary to prove a belligerent or biased
attitude in giving testimony in order to show that a witness is
hostile. It suffices to show that a witness' interest is on the side
of the accused to such an extent that he or she is unlikely to give
a true account of the transaction. ' 7 The fact that the witness in
question had been having an illicit relationship with the defend-
ant was deemed an ample showing.
4. 185 La. 849, 171 So. 52 (1936).
5. 241 La. 796, 131 So.2d 792 (1961).
6. See very interesting discussion of this general problem 'by Judge Hutcheson
in Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200, 117 A.L.R. 316 (5th Cir. 1938).
7. 131 So.2d 792, 795 (La. 1961).
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RELEVANCY
Offers to Purchase
In expropriation proceedings, triable to the court without a
jury,8 should the defendant be permitted to introduce into evi-
dence bona fide offers received by him to purchase the subject
property? Relying upon Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. MorereP
and "the fact that such evidence is inherently unreliable, being
highly susceptible to fabrication," the court in State v. McDuf-
fie"0 held that even if found to be bona fide, offers to purchase
are "inadmissible as evidence of market value in expropriation
cases." The position of the court is in accord with the weight of
authority." Nevertheless, it seems to this writer that evidence
such as that offered in the McDuffie case should be admissible in
Louisiana expropriation cases. Such cases are tried by a judge
sitting without a jury.12 When weighed and evaluated by a
trained legal mind, the risk that undue weight will be ascribed
to it or that imposition might result is substantially lessened.
The fact that the defendant received but rejected a bona fide
offer certainly seems to indicate that the fair market value was
at least as high as the amount offered. The fact that such evi-
dence is subject to fabrication seems to this writer to be no more
true than with much admissible evidence. In the context of Lou-
isiana expropriation cases, the value to be gained by receiving
such evidence seems to outweigh the dangers.
Gruesome Photographs
In State v. Eubanks3 the court once again rejected argument
that a trial court had committed reversible error in overruling
defense counsel's objections to the admissibility of allegedly
"gruesome" photographs of the deceased. Two photographs
were involved in the Eubanks case, one taken at the scene of the
crime and the other at the morgue. Defense counsel unsuccess-
8. LA. R.S. 19:4, 48:454 (1950). See Comment, Expropriation -A Survey
of Louisiana Law, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 509, 523 et seq. (1958).
9. 116 La. 997, 41 So. 236 (1906).
10. 240 La. 378, 123 So.2d 93 (1960).
11. See Comment, Expropriation -A Survey of Louisiana Law, 18 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 509, 543 et seq. (1958) ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 166 (1954) ; 4
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.3113(3) (4th ed. 1962) ; Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d
781 et seq. (1949).
12. See note 8 supra.
13. 240 La. 552, 124 So.2d 543 (1960).
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fully relied upon State v. Morgan.1 4 After an extensive review
of other authorities and repeating a quotation from State v.
SolomonI 5 that "State v. Morgan is to be regarded as - indeed
it is - a case of most unusual circumstances," the Supreme
Court in Eubanks stated: "In the light of the jurisprudence
which we have discussed at length, we shall not comment on the
Morgan case."'16 The court now seems to adhere strongly to the
position that the fact that photographs are gruesome and tend
to prejudice the jury does not cause them to be inadmissible, if
they are relevant to a material fact. Regretfully, it must be
recognized that the authoritative value of the approach taken
in State v. Morgan now appears to be all but eliminated.17
COMPETENCY
Attorney as Witness
A novel and interesting point was raised and decided in State
v. Newton,'8 an aggravated rape case. On the hearing of a mo-
tion for new trial, one of the two defense counsel stated that his
co-counsel (who was also his law partner) desired to give testi-
mony for the purpose of impeaching one of the state's witnesses
at the hearing. Directing the attention of the court to the pro-
visions of Article 19 of the Canons of Professional Ethics that:
"When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to mere-
ly formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an
instrument and the like, he shall leave the trial of the case
to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice,
a lawyer shall avoid testifying in court in behalf of his cli-
ent."
and stating that neither his co-counsel nor their client wished
co-counsel to withdraw from the case, he requested the court to
order co-counsel to testify so that "we would be protected
against any charge that might be brought as a result of our
14. 211 La. 572, 30 So.2d 434 (1947), discussed in Note on State v. McMullan,
223 La. 629, 66 So.2d 574 (1953), in 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 421 (1954) ;
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term -Evidence,
14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 220 (1953) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1956-1957 Term- Evidence, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 139
(1957). See also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959
Term, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 335, 339 (1960).
15. 222 La. 269, 62 So.2d 481 (1953).
16. 240 La. 552, 561, 562, 124 So.2d 543, 547 (1960).
17. See also the authorities cited in note 14 supra.
18. 241 La. 261, 128 So.2d 651 (1961).
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testifying."19 Although the trial judge made it very clear that
he would allow defense counsel to testify, he refused to "order"
him to do so. In light of this ruling, co-counsel did not testify,
but took a bill of exceptions. In his per curiam, the trial judge
expressed the view that whether to testify or not was a question
for co-counsel to decide, and that the court "could not compel
him to testify." On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the action
of the trial court.
Whether co-counsel's testifying would or would not have been
a breach of professional ethics does not detract from the fact
that he was a competent witness, and whatever improprieties
might have been involved in his testifying and continuing as co-
counsel did not affect the admissibility of his testimony.2 0 In
this respect, the trial court was clearly correct. Of course, the
trial court was asked not merely to allow co-counsel to testify,
but to order him to do so. If co-counsel and his partner had both
withdrawn from the case and new counsel had come in to repre-
sent the defendant, then on request of the new counsel it would
certainly appear that the former attorney could have been sub-
poenaed and ordered to testify. Even absent this, however, it
would nevertheles appear that a defendant or his attorney would
be entitled to a subpoena and an order by the court to have the
witness (even a defense counsel) so subpoenaed testify. The
question of whether the defense counsel so subpoenaed should
withdraw from the case or remain would appear to involve
ethical considerations not pertinent to the right of the defendant
to have a witness subpoenaed and ordered to testify. Whether
or not the proceedings outlined above should be considered as
tantamount to a request for a subpoena and an order to a wit-
ness so subpoenaed to testify seems to this writer to be the es-
sential inquiry. The Supreme Court, it is felt, was reasonable
in not so construing them.
PRIVILEGE
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Section 11 of Article I of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921
stipulates that, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution,
"no person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself
19. 128 So.2d at 652.
20. See State v. Woodville, 161 La. 125, 108 So. 309 (1926) ; Succession of
Grant, 14 La. Ann. 795 (1859); Annot., 118 A.L.R. 954 (1939).
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in a criminal case or in any proceeding that may subject him to
criminal prosecution." Section 13 of Article XIX provides that
"any person" may be compelled to testify in any proceeding
against "anyone" who may be charged with having committed
bribery, but that, except for perjury committed in giving such
testimony, it shall not thereafter be used against the witness in
any judicial proceeding. In State v. Smalling2' the Supreme
Court held that if a person is compelled to give testimony of a
self-incriminatory nature before a grand jury investigating
bribery, a bill of information filed against him, which is based
in whole or in part upon such testimony, must be quashed,
whether or not he was the party being investigated at the grand
jury proceeding. In so holding, the court rejected the conten-
tion of the state that the protective immunity of Section 13,
Article XIX, does not afford protection to a person who is sum-
moned to testify in a proceeding wherein such person is the
party being investigated for bribery, but only to a person who
is appearing as a witness against someone else.
HEARSAY
Spontaneous Declarations
In State v. Hils 22 the Supreme Court was called upon to rule
as to the admissibility of an oral statement made by the prosecu-
trix in a rape case shortly after the alleged occurrence, including
data given at that time as to the description of the assailant.
Over objection, the landlord of the prosecutrix was permitted to
testify that shortly after midnight, the prosecutrix, battered,
bruised, disheveled, and hysterical, had banged upon his door,
and, after calming down, related that she had just been raped,
describing the perpetrator of the offense. At this stage of the
trial, the prosecutrix herself had not yet testified. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court, noting that "there is a tendency of the courts
to extend rather than narrow the scope of the introduction of
evidence as res gestae, ' '23 held that the evidence was properly
admissible. Apparently, the majority of American jurisdictions
would hold such evidence inadmissible as hearsay,2 4 but it would
21. 240 La. 887, 125 So.2d 399 (1960).
22. 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d 12 (1961).
23. 129 So.2d at 21.
24. See WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1134-1140, 1760-1761 (3d ed. 1940).
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seem that no less an authority than Professor Wigmore would
favor admissibility under the circumstances. 25
Since here the condition of the accused, as described by the
witness, afforded ample evidence that the alleged rape had in
fact recently taken place and in view of the startling nature of
the occurrence, there seems to be much merit to the position
that her statement to the landlord should be admissible under
the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
25. Ibid.
